The International Legal Status of Informal International Law-making Bodies: Consequences for Accountability by Berman, A. & Wessel, R.A.
1 
 
The International Legal Status of Informal International 
Law-making Bodies: Consequences for Accountability  
 
 
Ayelet Berman and Ramses Wessel
1
 
 
 
Draft ‒ to be published in J. Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel and J. Wouters (Eds.), Informal International 
Lawmaking: Mapping the Action and Testing Concepts of Accountability and Effectiveness, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012 (forthcoming) 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Informal international law-making (IN-LAW) is a broad phenomenon that is taking 
place in various forms and by different kinds of bodies. According to Pauwelyn, the informal 
character of this international law-making process may be reflected at three levels: process 
informality (cross-border cooperation between public authorities, with or without the 
participation of private actors and/or international organisations (IOs), in a forum other than a 
traditional international organization), actor informality (between actors other than traditional 
diplomatic actors (such as regulators or agencies) and output informality (does not result in a 
formal treaty or traditional source of international law).
2
 
  
In this chapter, we take a closer look at two kinds of IN-LAW bodies that have become 
prevalent in the past two decades: what we refer to in this paper as international agencies and 
harmonization networks. International agencies are international bodies that are based on a 
decision by an IO. Harmonisation networks are international networks of national public 
regulatory authorities that are in the business of harmonizing their rules or setting standards or 
other norms.  
  
While these and other informal bodies have received significant attention in the political 
science and IR scholarship, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the 
these bodies, as well as IN-LAW bodies more generally, from a public international law 
perspective. We first seek to define their status under public international law according to 
traditional and progressive approaches. The international legal status of the bodies is important 
to be able to define the applicability of (general) international law.
3
 The problem of 
accountability being the main concern of the IN-LAW project, we then seek to understand the 
consequence of their status for the question of accountability.  
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As we shall see, despite the process or actor informality of these bodies, many have 
formal operations, as is reflected in the existence of detailed procedural rules, permanent staff, 
or a physical headquarter. Nevertheless, on the one hand, under most traditional accounts, they 
cannot be classified as IOs or as possessing international legal personality. On the other hand, 
liberal interpretation of traditional definitions and/or progressive approaches may lead to 
different conclusions. 
 
Be that as it may, seen from an accountability perspective, this debate is largely 
theoretical and of little practical use. In the current state of international law, whether a body has 
international legal personality or not is of little meaning to accountability. Accountability, as 
referred to in Pauwelyn’s introductory chapter, focuses on procedural aspects such as oversight 
mechanisms, transparency and participation.
4
 In the absence of any procedural international law 
on accountability (that is, setting out rules on good administrative practice such as transparency, 
participation of stakeholders, reason giving, complaints, and remedial mechanisms), subjects of 
international law are not formally bound by any accountability rules.  
 
A different concern is whether IN-LAW bodies escape substantive international law, 
say human rights law. On this topic we need to keep in mind that IN-LAW bodies are composed 
(at least partly) of governmental actors. These actors, even if they are not diplomats, may be 
bound by international law on the basis of the rules on international responsibility. We can think 
of it as a situation that is similar to a situation of partnership in domestic law where, in the 
absence of legal personality, each partner is responsible for the activities of the partnership. 
Hence, even in the absence of legal personality, IN-LAW bodies do not entirely escape 
substantive international law.  
 
All the same, there are advantages of having legal personality: IN-LAW bodies could be 
directly subject to substantive international law (albeit partly), and as such, claims regarding 
breaches of international law could be made directly towards them. The consequence of this 
approach would be that private actors collaborating in IN-LAW bodies would also not escape 
international law. As the normative effects of IN-LAW bodies become more important, and 
their power increases, such an approach would indeed appear to be justified. At the same time, 
we must not forget that in the absence of complaints mechanisms in international law, it is 
unclear how any international responsibility could be enforced. Moreover, such an independent 
status has possible drawbacks, such as diminishing the power of domestic accountability 
mechanisms that are currently in place. There is, hence, need to further contemplate the 
consequences, and the advantages and disadvantages of granting (at least some) IN-LAW 
bodies with legal personality.  
 
The Chapter is organized as follows. We first describe the emergence of new bodies in 
global governance and their role in making informal international law (section B). We then 
describe the main characteristics of harmonisation networks (Section C) and international 
agencies (Section D). In Section E we examine the international legal status of harmonisation 
networks and international agencies, We distinguish between the traditional approach (1) and 
contemporary approaches (2), including whether IN-LAW bodies should have international 
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legal personality (2c). We then consider the importance of international legal personality for the 
question of accountability (Section F). Section G is used to draw some tentative conclusions.  
 
 
B. The emergence of new global bodies and the making of informal 
international law 
 
One of the challenges to the discipline of public international law in the past two to 
three decades has been the rise of bodies at the global level that play a role in international or 
transnational normative processes but cannot be captured by the traditional definition of 
subjects of international law. That is, they are not States and do not fall within the traditional 
definition of an IO and/or lack international legal personality (ILP) in the traditional sense. 
What makes things even more complicated for the discipline of international law is that some of 
these bodies generate norms, such as best practices, guidelines, and so forth that affect a wide 
range of countries, companies and people, without these being considered sources of 
international law. Irrespective of the legal status of the norms that are the product of these non-
traditional bodies, there is some agreement on the idea that ‘lawmaking is no longer the 
exclusive preserve of states’.5  
  
Being beyond the traditional, formal delimitations of international law, the IN-LAW 
project has coined the term informal international law making to describe this phenomenon. It is 
defined as  
 
cross-border cooperation between public authorities, with or without the participation of 
private actors and/or international organizations, in a forum other than a traditional 
international organization (process informality), and/or as between actors other than 
traditional diplomatic actors (such as regulators or agencies) (actor informality) and/or 
which does not result in a formal treaty or traditional source of international law (output 
informality).’6 
 
In an attempt to essentially capture the same phenomenon, other international legal 
scholars have described it as ‘post-national rule-making’7 or as the ‘exercise of international 
public authority’8. The latter submits that ‘any kind of governance activity by international 
institutions, be it administrative or intergovernmental, should be considered as an exercise of 
international public authority if it determines individuals, private associations, enterprises, 
states, or other public institutions.’ The IN-LAW project covers only those bodies in which 
public actors are involved; hence, the key questions underlying the project (related to 
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accountability) become relevant in particular when such international public authority is 
exercised.  
Apart from being outside the traditional structures of international law, IN-LAW also 
tends to be characterized by several other factors:  
  
First, IN-LAW tends to be characterized by so-called multi-level regulation. Multi-level 
regulation, similar to the notion of multi-level governance as developed in political science and 
public administration, describes from a legal perspective the interactions between global, 
regional, and national regulatory spheres.
9
 In most States, decisions made at the international or 
transnational level require implementation in the domestic legal order before they become valid 
legal norms, and the density of the global governance web has caused some interplay between 
the normative processes at various levels. In other cases, rules are adopted by IOs, such as the 
WTO, which allow them to indirectly affect national legal orders.
 10
   
  
These interactions between national and international legal spheres, including the regional legal 
sphere for regional organisations, have intensified and gained increased visibility over the past 
few years. It is becoming ever more difficult to draw dividing lines between legal orders. It 
should be noted that most research on multi-level regulation has focused on the EU, but the 
phenomenon is also taking place in other regions, such as the ASEAN region.  
  
The multi-level regulation school of thought demonstrates that international law is 
increasingly coming to play a role in national and regional legal orders, whereas national and 
regional legal developments are exerting a bottom-up influence on the evolution of the 
international legal order.
11
 This has led some observers to argue that the  
 
Central pillars of the international legal order are seen from a classical perspective as 
increasingly challenged: the distinction between domestic and international law 
becomes more precarious, soft forms of rule-making are ever more widespread, the 
sovereign equality of states is gradually undermined, and the basis of legitimacy of 
international law is increasingly in doubt.
12
  
 
Second, while the IN-LAW project draws attention to the fact that an increasing number 
of public and private actors are part of the global normative web, obviously States and IOs 
continue to play their role in global rule-making. Hence, what we see is the creation of a web of 
States, IOs, NGOs, transnational actors, and regulatory authorities that are all playing an 
important role in global governance. Collaboration is also increasingly beyond the public-
private divide: in some issue areas, there is intense cooperation between State and non-State 
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actors. In some areas, States even have even ceased to play a role in governance and 
transnational actors have taken over.  
 
Recently, Koppell sketched ‒ both empirically and conceptually ‒ the organisation of 
global rule-making. Even in the absence of a centralized global State, the population of what he 
refers to as GGOs is not a completely atomized collection of entities. ‘They interact, formally 
and informally on a regular basis. In recent years, their programs are more tied together, 
creating linkages that begin to weave a web of transnational rules and regulations.’13 This 
resulted in a network of multiple GGOs consisting of a variety of governmental, non-
governmental and hybrid organisations, which have as their main objective the crafting of rules 
and standards for worldwide application.
14
 
 
Third, the informality of so many of these global bodies has raised many accountability 
and legitimacy concerns, and it is this concern that is at the basis of the IN-LAW project. In a 
nutshell, the concern is that States, companies and individuals are confronted by rules that are 
adopted in settings that exercise a de facto decision-making power beyond the reach of the 
accountability measures of domestic or international law.
15
 And several cases in the present 
book have indeed related informality to a lack of accountability and effectiveness.
16
 
 
IN-LAW, as defined above, includes a large number of bodies. From within the plethora 
of bodies active at the global level, in the following sections we will take a closer look at two 
kinds of informal international law-making bodies: harmonisation networks and international 
agencies. Although both types of bodies differ substantially, we feel that they both represent 
trends that make the implications of IN-LAW quite visible. 
 
 
C. Harmonisation networks 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Harmonisation networks as understood in this paper are networks of public regulatory 
authorities (at times in collaboration with private partners) that are in the business of 
harmonising their domestic rules, setting standards or other norms. Anne-Marie Slaughter is the 
scholar to have made the most notable contribution to our understanding of networks of public 
regulatory authorities, or what she refers to as ‘trans-governmental regulatory networks’. She 
defines them as ‘pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units 
working across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the 
“domestic” from the “international” sphere’.17 They allow domestic officials to interact with 
their foreign counterparts directly, without much supervision by foreign offices or senior 
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executives, and feature loosely-structured, peer-to-peer ties developed through frequent 
interaction.
18
 The networks are composed of national government officials, either appointed by 
elected officials or directly elected,
 
and they may be among judges, legislators, or regulators.
19
  
 
While Slaughter’s work focused on networks composed purely of public regulatory 
authorities, in reality, regulators often collaborate with private bodies, too, in particular in 
harmonisation networks. For example, the US, EU, and Japanese drug regulatory authorities 
collaborate with the medical devices industry associations in the Global Harmonization Task 
Force (GHTF), or US and EU aviation authorities collaborate with aviation industry 
organizations on the US-EU Aviation Harmonization Work Program.  
 
While in some cases, trans-governmental regulatory networks are nothing more than 
talking shops, that is, they provide a forum for the exchange of information and experience, 
harmonization networks actually engage in standard-setting, harmonization, or setting of norms. 
Harmonization networks should be of particular interest to the IN-LAW project since they serve 
as excellent examples of informal international law-making by actually issuing norms,. 
Examples include the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Conference 
on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use (ICH), or the Financial Stability Board (FSB). 
  
Harmonisation networks are not only a global phenomenon, but quite popular in 
regional settings, too. The most concentrated site for such networks is the EU.
20
 Another area of 
dense networking is in the transatlantic relationship between the US and the EU.
21
 But networks 
are present in other regions as well, including the pharmaceutical Harmonization Networks in 
Southeast Asia (ASEAN PPWG), the Gulf region (GCC-DR), South America (PANDRH), and 
others. Similarly, the Asian Harmonization Working Party works toward the harmonisation of 
medical devices regulation in Asia.
22
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2. Characteristics of harmonisation networks 
 
a. Membership 
Harmonisation networks are composed of public regulatory authorities. For example, 
the International Cooperation on Cosmetics Regulation (ICCR) is comprised of cosmetic 
regulatory authorities from the US, EU, Japan, and Canada.
23
 The Financial Stability Board 
brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability.
24
 Often, the relevant 
private sector ‒ in particular the respective industry association ‒ will be a member, too. For 
example, drug industry associations from the US, EU, and Japan are ICH members.
25
  
 
The membership spectrum is broad. Whereas some harmonisation networks tend to  
emulate the format of a club with a limited number of participants, others tend to be more 
inclusive. For example, on one side of the spectrum we find the GHTF, which consists of drug 
regulatory authorities and industry associations from the US, Europe, Japan, Canada, and 
Australia.
26
 Similarly, the ICH has members from the US, EU and Japan. On the other side of 
the spectrum, IOSCO brings together over 100 securities regulators.
27
 Even more extensive is 
the International Competition Network (ICN), which brings together regulators from all five 
continents.
28
 The FATF also accepts a relatively broad membership.
29
  
 
Due to increased interest by outsiders, some of the club-like harmonisation networks 
have slowly been opening up and allowing greater participation, in particular by emerging 
countries, in their work. For example, the ICH, has in recent years set up a Global Cooperation 
Group and a Regulators Forum in order to cooperate with other regional harmonisation 
networks and drug regulatory authorities, respectively. The Basel Committee, originally 
founded by the G-10 industrial economies, and comprised of central bankers, has also expanded 
and now includes significant emerging economies such as China and Brazil.
30
 Moreover, in 
many of these organisations, observer status or different levels of membership with different 
rights attached are common. That is the case, for example, in the FATF, or the International 
Cooperation on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Veterinary 
Medicinal Products (VICH).
31
 
 
b. The legal basis for their cooperation  
Under traditional international law, regulatory authorities ‒ as sub-units of the State ‒ 
lack independent international legal personality (we discuss this further below). Unless 
authorized by the State, they will, as a rule, not conclude treaties on behalf of the State. 
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Consequently, trans-governmental regulatory cooperation is often conducted on the basis of 
non-binding agreements, such as MOUs.
32
 These are signed by regulators as non-binding 
statements of their intent to cooperate. Often, cooperation takes place in the form of informal 
initiatives without any sort of MOU between the regulators involved. For example, in the case 
of the ICH and GHTF, the basis for their cooperation is a Terms of Reference issued by the 
parties. These documents, while informal, often have a constitutional nature.
33
  
 
c. The organizational framework in which harmonization networks operate  
Harmonisation networks operate in different contexts. Some operate within the 
framework of an IO, whereas others operate independently of any traditional framework.  
 
The Blood Regulators Network is an example of a harmonisation network within an IO. 
It is comprised of regulatory authorities that have responsibility for the regulation of blood 
products, and whose activities take place under the auspices of the WHO.
34
 These types of 
networks come close to the international agencies discussed below. 
 
The second kind of harmonisation networks ‒ those that operate outside of IOs ‒ are of 
particular interest to the IN-LAW project as they do not correspond to the traditional definitions 
of IOs, but are nevertheless institutionalised. Examples include the Basel Committee, IOSCO, 
the ICN, the ICH, and the VICH.  
 
d. Internal structure and governance  
Trans-governmental regulatory networks may operate at different levels of 
institutionalisation. While some may be extremely unstructured, some have become more 
institutionalised.
35
 The latter is in particular the case in harmonization networks such as Basel, 
IOSCO and the ICH that are highly institutionalised, and could rightfully be considered trans-
governmental regulatory organizations (TROs).
36
 They have many of the characteristics 
commonly associated with an organisation. The ICH, for instance, is composed of a permanent 
steering committee and working groups, has a secretariat and organizes public conferences. It 
has documents comparable to constitutions which set out the governance and the structure of the 
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organisation as well as the harmonised guideline development procedure.
37
 Furthermore, it has 
online presence with a website of its own, it conducts consultations and so forth.  
 
Having said that, the level of institutionalisation of harmonisation networks is still 
relatively light in comparison to traditional IOs: their secretariats tend to be rotating amongst 
members (such as in GHTF), or they are too small and thus rely on a secretariat of an IO or an 
industry association. For example, the Basel Committee’s secretariat services are provided by 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), and the ICH’s secretariat is located with the 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA). They 
have few employees, if any, and other than regular meeting schedules, they have no permanent 
presence. They feature either a small budget or no budget at all, with each member usually 
covering their own costs.  
 
Finally, many harmonisation networks have developed administrative features that are 
traditionally marked as features of democratically governed domestic systems of administrative 
law.
38
 For example, the governance structure, operation and guideline development procedure of 
the ICH, VICH, GHTF, and ICCR are set out in constitution-like documents. The guideline-
development procedures include elements similar to notices and comments as well as 
instructions regarding transparency and consultations with stakeholders. Their websites make 
many of their meeting minutes, framework documents, and so forth available to the public. The 
Basel Committee has similar administrative features, too. 
 
e. The output  
The documents issued by harmonisation networks are typically considered not legally 
binding. Nevertheless, members are expected to implement the guidelines in their domestic 
legal system. In the GHTF, for example, ‘founding Members will take appropriate steps to 
implement GHTF guidance and policies within the boundaries of their legal and institutional 
constraints.’39 Similarly, the Basel Committee members have agreed to implement the accords 
within their own domestic system. And indeed, in practice the guidelines enjoy widespread 
compliance and considerable normative force, which puts their non-legally binding character 
into perspective.  
 
The normative effect of the guidelines extends beyond the member regions. In practice, 
the guidelines are often adopted by non-members. For example, more than 100 States have 
implemented the Basel Accords to a greater or lesser degree.
40
 Similarly, ICH guidelines, setting 
out rules for approval of new medicines, have been adopted globally by many non-members.
41
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D. International agencies 
 
1.  Introduction 
Apart from harmonisation networks, a relatively new development is the proliferation of 
what this chapter refers to as international agencies’i. That is, international bodies that are 
neither based on a treaty nor on a bottom-up cooperation between national regulators, but on a 
decision by an IO. According to some observers, these international agencies even outnumber 
conventional organisations.
42
 We consider that the specific characteristics of international 
agencies, that is, their position between IOs and member States justifies a separate analysis. 
  
It is not unusual for International Agencies to ‘exercise public authority’ (as defined 
above). Here also, the tendency towards functional specialisation because of the technical 
expertise required in many areas may be a reason for the proliferation of such bodies and for 
their interaction with other IOs and agencies, which sometimes leads to the creation of common 
bodies.  
 
International (regulatory) cooperation is often conducted between these non-
conventional international bodies.
43
 Whereas traditional IOs are established by an agreement 
between States, in which their control over the organisation and the division of powers is laid 
out,
44
 the link between newly created international bodies and the States that established the 
parent organisation is less clear. As one observer holds, this ‘demonstrates how the entity’s will 
does not simply express the sum of the member states’ positions, but reformulates them at a 
higher level of complexity, assigning decision-making power to different subjects, especially to 
the international institutions that promoted the establishment of the new organization.’45  
   
It is not entirely uncommon for IOs to establish bodies with public law functions. Since 
these bodies are usually not based on a treaty, they would traditionally not qualify as IOs 
themselves.
46
 A first possibility is that these bodies are set up by one IO only, to help attain the 
objectives of that organisation. The most well-known examples include the bodies established 
by the UN General Assembly (such as UNCTAD, UNEP, UNIDO, UNCHS, UNFPA and 
UNDP). These bodies are usually referred to as subsidiary organs
47
, or as quasi-autonomous 
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bodies (QABs)
48
. Special bodies were also set up by the UN Specialised Agencies and other 
UN-related organisations.
49
 A case in point is the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, a 
subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council, with its competence to place an individual on the 
consolidated list of terrorist suspects.
50
 In many cases this type of international agency has the 
characteristics of an IO in its own right and is therefore less relevant for our analysis of IN-
LAW. 
  
A second group of bodies is created by two or more IOs in areas where the problems 
they face transcend their individual competences. While these bodies may be established on the 
basis of a treaty concluded between IOs (as was the case with the International Center for the 
Improvement of Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT), created in 1988 by the World Bank and the 
UNDP; or the Vienna Institute, created in 1992 by the BIS, EBRD, IBDR, IFM, OECD and – 
later – the WTO), more frequently they are the result of decisions taken by the respective 
organisations. It is not even exceptional for the above-mentioned subsidiary organs to, in turn, 
act as a parent organisation for the newly created bodies (thus leading to what could be termed 
third-level international bodies). Thus, in 1994, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, the 
WHO and the World Bank instituted UNAIDS (the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS) and earlier examples include the World Food Programme (WFP; created by the 
FAO and the WHO in 1961), the Codex Alimentarius Commission (a 1962 FAO and WHO 
initiative), the International Trade Centre (WTO and UNCTAD in 1968), the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (WMO and UNEP in 1998), the Joint Group of Experts in the 
Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP, created by the IMO, FAO, 
UNESCO and WMO in 1969), and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF, created by the 
World Bank in 1991 and joined by UNDP and UNEP).
51
 An example is also formed by the 
World Heritage Convention (WHC), whose parties are the UNESCO member States that have 
ratified the convention itself, while States, intergovernmental, or non-governmental 
organisations that are not UNESCO members may accede to the WHC, either as participants or 
as advisors. 
 
 
2. Characteristics of International Agencies 
 
Irrespective of our use of the term international agencies for public law bodies 
established by IOs, there seems to be a great deal of differentiation among the institutional 
designs and practices of various agencies. The question is whether it is possible to identify some 
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core legal features that are common to international agencies. Does the label simply refer to 
second generation international bodies, established by one or more IOs? Or it is possible to 
distinguish a more articulated regulatory structure, based on a number of shared legal features?  
 
The aim of the present section is to identify the nature of these bodies by attempting to 
define them on the basis of possible common characteristics.
52
 
  
a. Membership  
The membership of most International Agencies is usually strictly linked to the 
membership of the establishing organizations. Thus, membership is normally open to all 
member states and other members of the ‘parent organization’. At the same time, non-
governmental organizations and IOs that are not members of the establishing institutions may 
usually join the International Agency as observers, in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
the parent organization. 
 
b. Internal structure 
Though not always (but quite often) provided with legal personality, international 
agencies usually share a structure centred around four pillars, reflecting the mainstream of the 
establishing IOs: a main collegiate body composed of representatives of all members; an 
executive committee made up of representatives of a limited number of members; several 
subsidiary bodies responsible for specific tasks and usually composed of representatives of a 
limited number of members; and an administrative secretariat made up of officials serving the 
international agency. 
 
c. Relations with member States 
Member states participate in international agencies in two main regards. To begin with, 
the internal offices of international agencies are composed of member States’ representatives; 
the main exception being the administrative secretariat, which is composed of international 
officials serving the international agency. All other offices have a plenary or selective 
transnational composition. This results in interesting dynamics: on the one hand, member States 
influence and condition the international agencies’ decision-making procedures; on the other 
hand, they are in turn influenced and conditioned by the institutional contexts in which they 
express their voice. The agency’s institutional context is capable of putting the will of single 
member States into perspective and the offices may represent an instrument for the international 
agency to penetrate the domestic orders, communicating with national administrations, and 
directing them towards specific goals and objectives. 
  
Member States participate not only in the internal structure, but also in the 
administrative proceedings taking place within international agencies themselves. As a matter of 
fact, international regulation lays down a number of administrative proceedings that require the 
intervention not only of the relevant international agency, but also of national and composite 
                                                          
52
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administrations. Administrative proceedings involving international agencies do not usually 
result from the introduction of new, international layers of procedure on top of pre-existing 
national procedures. Yet, they are composite administrative proceedings and may involve and 
integrate a number of international, national, and mixed authorities. Such composite 
administrative proceedings allow for a different form of participation of member States in the 
activities of international agencies. Whereas the voice of member States is usually expressed in 
collegiate bodies in which several strategies may be developed, composite administrative 
proceedings stabilize the cooperation between a number of national, international, and mixed 
competent authorities. 
 
d. Relations with other international institutions 
 The relationship between international agencies and other global and regional institutions 
may differ from the one between the parent organization and other institutions. In this case, the 
relevant global regulatory system participates in the international agency in the same way 
member States do. Most commonly, however, global regulatory systems do not become 
members of an international agency, but acquire an observer status or establish other forms of 
cooperation that are not necessarily formalized in an agreement. In both cases, the parent 
organizations exercises a strict control over the relations between the established agency and 
other international organisations. 
 
e. Involvement of private parties 
International agencies are public law bodies established by IOs and, presumably, subject 
to public law institutes and rules. Although some authors point to the hybrid private-public 
regime of some important International Agencies, such as CAC, usually the interaction of 
private parties does not lead to any kind of hybrid nature of the international agency.
53
 In most 
cases certain private parties are conferred some procedural guarantees in the administrative 
proceedings taking place before international agencies, to provide the latter further information 
and expertise. In a more limited number of cases, private parties have a formal representation 
within the internal structure of the relevant international agency, in particular in a collegiate 
body provided with advisory power. 
 
f. Powers and administrative law mechanisms 
Finally, international agencies tend to converge as far as their powers are concerned. 
Again, we see a mixed picture. The powers granted to international agencies are often 
constructed either as simple coordination of member States’ activities or as non-binding 
regulatory powers. And yet, such powers tend in practice to go well beyond mere coordination 
and gain a genuinely binding regulatory character. 
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 This substantial evolution of the powers of international agencies is usually 
accompanied by the development of administrative law mechanisms. Such mechanisms vary 
considerably from case to case. Yet, in all cases they respond to the exigency of strengthening 
control over the functioning and operations of international agencies through the provision of a 
number of administrative principles and rules applying to decision-making. Their sources 
include treaties and general principles of public international law. More often, however, 
administrative law mechanisms are established by non-treaty law-making of the parent 
organisations as well as of international agencies per se, including soft law measures.  
 
As for their content, the emerging administrative law principles and rules tend to 
converge around decisional transparency, procedural participation and reasoned decisions, while 
review by a court or other independent tribunal is normally excluded. In particular, international 
agencies develop a practice of transparency by releasing, generally on their websites, 
administrative decisions, information on which they are based and material on internal decision-
making. Moreover, participation in decision-making proceedings has been promoted. Notably, 
procedural guarantees are designed as rights of States and are granted to all member States, not 
only to those directly affected by regulatory decisions. Procedural guarantees are extended to 
civil society and private actors, although their effective role in the decision-making process is 
contested and their formal rights are often more limited than those granted to States. 
 
g. The autonomy of international agencies 
IOs usually do much more with their authority than their creators intended and are even 
forced to do so. And, indeed, States have created IOs also in cases where they themselves lack 
the necessary expertise. And it is exactly their expertise that may form a source of the (exercise 
of public) authority of international agencies.
54
 While IOs must be autonomous actors to be able 
to fulfil their delegated tasks
55
, the assumption could be that their autonomy will only be 
strengthened if they use their mandate to set up international bodies that were not (explicitly) 
part of the original delegation.  
  
In relation to international agencies, Martini argued that the loss of States’ influence – 
and hence the autonomous position of international agencies – is reflected in at least three 
phenomena
56
: (1) the fact that the new entities emerge from the regular decisions of other 
organisations, rather than through the treaty-making process, compromises States’ ability to 
influence not only their creation but also their further development; (2) States may lose some 
powers to the parent organisations, such as the power to appoint the new entity’s executive 
heads; moreover, they might have to share the power to define and manage the organisation’s 
activities; and (3) in the non-state-created organisations the international secretariat plays a 
greater role.  
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Many of the established bodies may exercise functions exclusively and independently 
from their parent organisation(s). After all, the very reason to establish an agency is that the 
organisation wishes to outsource certain technical or operational tasks.
57
 Decision-making in 
these areas should then not be subject to (political) control by States. The autonomy of the 
agency is thus related to its relative independent position (as a bureaucracy) from the parent 
organisation, and thus, from the member States of that organisation.  
  
 In practice, however, the picture is, at best, mixed. Research reveals that International 
Agencies continue to be dependent on member States, in so far as their internal architecture has 
an intergovernmental or multinational nature, and they operate through administrative 
proceedings to which national authorities are called to participate in. In functional terms, 
irrespective of their bureaucratic character, many international agencies can even be seen as 
mechanisms of administrative cooperation and integration among domestic authorities.
58
 On the 
other hand, certain forms of autonomy towards member States are emerging, in particular in 
cases where scientific expertise plays a large role. Ironically, it may very well be their pivotal 
position in the global regulatory network – with tentacles that reach within domestic legal 
orders as well as towards global and regional institutions – that allows them to be key actors in 
IN-LAW. 
 
 
E. The international legal status of harmonisation networks and international 
agencies 
 
1. The traditional approach under international law 
 
In this section we examine the traditional definitions in public international law of 
international legal personality and intergovernmental organization, and how harmonisation 
networks (or more generally, Trans-governmental Regulatory Networks) and International 
Agencies fit in, if at all.  
  
While there is no formal definition of an IO under international law, there is a common 
understanding (based on practice, scholars, etc.) regarding the main criteria that need to be 
fulfilled. These criteria are (1) some form of international agreement, (2) between states, (3) 
autonomy or will of its own, and (4) international legal personality.
59
  
  
To have legal personality, a body needs to be ‘capable of possessing rights and duties 
under international law’60. 
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a. Harmonisation networks  
Trans-governmental Regulatory Networks in general, and harmonization networks as a 
particular case, do not constitute IOs and lack international legal personality under the 
traditional definitions in public international law.  
  
As we have seen, first, harmonization networks are usually not based on an international 
agreement, but rather on agreements that are not intended to be legally binding (such as a 
MOUs, gentlemen’s agreements or no written agreement at all) by regulators. Second, while 
some of the documents have constitutional characteristics, they are not concluded by unitary 
States, as Schermers and Blokker have pointed out: ‘agreements between branches of different 
governments or between particular public authorities do not normally create international 
organizations.’61  
  
Third, the existence of autonomy or a separate will is a defining element for an IO to 
have legal personality
62
, and this is used to distinguish IOs from other forms of institutionalized 
cooperation amongst States.
63
 Most often, the decision-making organs of harmonisation 
networks reach their decisions on the basis of consensus. As such, they express the consolidated 
will of the State parties, rather than an independent and distinct will of the network. The 
secretariat, too, will usually not have independent powers. Moreover, autonomy is often 
understood as meaning the capacity to conduct external relations. Indeed, harmonization 
networks may have extensive external relations with other networks, IOs, NGOs, or the private 
sector. For example, the GHTF has strong relations with the Asian Harmonization Working 
Party, and it also cooperates with ISO and the International Electro–technical Commission 
(IEC). The ICH cooperates with non-member drug regulatory authorities and has even 
established a ‘Global Cooperation Group’ in charge of these relationships. The VICH has a very 
close relationship with the World Animal Health Organization (OIE). However, all of these 
relations are informal in the sense that they are not based on legally-binding agreements. These 
are, therefore, not external relations in the traditional sense. 
  
Finally, harmonisation networks cannot be equated with the creation of a new 
international legal person, which would enjoy an independent status under public international 
law.
64
 Since traditionally sovereignty is possessed by the State as a whole, and not by its 
component parts, the organs of the State are not capable of possessing rights and duties at the 
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international level. As a result, harmonisation networks, being composed of regulatory 
authorities, are not considered as capable of possessing international legal personality. 
65
 
 
b. International agencies 
The situation may be somewhat ambiguous with regard to international agencies. 
Established by IOs, these agencies may have been granted a separate status under international 
law and may even be seen as a special type of IO. Thus, Martini labelled these bodies ‘second-
order international organizations’ as a dimension of what she called ‘New International 
Organization’.66 Nevertheless, one could argue that the existence of a separate will is debatable. 
As we have seen, the autonomy of international agencies is restricted, either because of their 
strong link with the parent organisation, or because of the dominant role played by member 
States.  
 
 
2. The contemporary approach 
 
The fact that trans-governmental regulatory networks are globally active and have 
significant normative effects on countries, companies, and individuals, but do not have an 
apparent place in international law has left legal scholars at unease. This has generated 
contemporary legal approaches to addressing them. International agencies have received less 
scholarly attention, but the contemporary approaches described below are partly relevant in 
assessing our approach to other IN-LAW bodies too. 
 
a. NGO’s, ‘twilight existence’ or soft organisations  
Not fulfilling the criteria of an IO or of legal personality, some have considered trans-
governmental regulatory networks to be NGOs.
67
 Others have argued that they are in a twilight 
existence, not being formally IOs, but comprised of State agencies.
68
 Along similar lines, 
Schermers and Blokker have argued that ‘[s]uch [organizations of branches of governments] are 
on the dividing line between governmental and non–governmental organizations.’69 Klabbers 
said that these entities ‘defy any attempt at definition and classification’70 and have simply 
referred to them as ‘soft organizations’71.  
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International agencies somehow escaped academic attention. Nevertheless, it seems to 
us that their twilight existence, albeit for different reasons, may be comparable to soft 
organizations in the sense that their status is somewhere between an international organisation 
and a TRN. 
 
 b. Stretching the definition of IO 
There have been developments in the literature that have sought to accommodate, on the 
basis of liberal and broad interpretation methods, certain informal entities within the traditional  
definition if an IO. For example, in 1999 Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill issued a legal opinion on 
the international legal status of the Inter–Parliamentary Union (IPU). The IPU is an organisation 
of parliaments from around the world which is not treaty-based.
72
 They concluded that the IPU 
enjoys international legal personality and is an international organisation sui generis.
73
 Brownlie 
and Goodwin-Gill stressed that even if an entity lacks the features of an IO, it may possess 
international legal personality.
74
  
   
The progressive element of their legal opinion relates to their interpretation of the 
notion of State membership in IOs. They consider the IPU to be an IO despite the fact that its 
members are State organs (parliaments) rather that unitary States, since they consider the State 
to be an ‘indirect participant’, granting ‘implicit consent’.75 Moreover, in claiming that IR has 
undergone transformation and is no longer merely diplomatic, they argue that there is no need 
for organs of the State to receive explicit or implicit consent by the executive.
76
 Thus, rather 
than moving away from the requirement of State membership, they simply offer a broad 
interpretation of the term, considering ‘implicit state consent’ or ‘indirect state participation’ as 
equivalent to State membership. Indeed, for many TRNs that State consent is implicit if not 
explicit. For example, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership between the US and EU makes 
the removal of third generation trade barriers, that is, the removal of technical regulatory 
differences between the US and EU, a priority, and expects this work to be done between 
regulators. While politicians are not involved in the important aspects and practical details of 
harmonisation, the regulators report to the political level about their transnational activities and 
harmonisation efforts, and the latter are, hence, well aware of such activities.
77
  
 
Other scholars have also argued that the notion of membership in IOs goes beyond 
unitary States only, and that there may be exceptions.
78
 For example, as early as 1971 
Morgenstern referred to a controversial UN legal opinion, which argued that ‘it may well be that 
a new customary rule of international law is emerging under which…a legal person could be 
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created by an agreement concluded solely by autonomous public entities, such an agreement 
being governed by international law pursuant to another new customary rule…’.79  
 
Moreover, the ILC, in the context of its work on the responsibility of IOs, has said that 
‘… 
[s]everal important international organizations have been established by State organs 
other than governments or by other organs together with governments…. [and that] an 
increasing number of international organizations include among their members entities 
other than States as well as States; the term ‘intergovernmental organization’ might be 
thought to exclude these organizations, although with regard to international 
responsibility it is difficult to see why one should reach solutions that differ from those 
applying to organizations of which only States are members.
80
  
 
It accordingly defined IO as ‘an organization established by treaty or other instrument 
governed by international law and possessing its own legal personality. International 
organizations may include as members, in addition to states, other entities.’81 ‘Other entities’ 
could, hence, be understood to mean sub-organs of the State (as well as private actors).  
 
Also with regard to the condition that an IO be based on a treaty, most writers 
acknowledge that there may be exceptions and that there may be alternative modes of creation.
82
 
Thus, a treaty base is not a conditio sine qua non to be an IO, and the source of the legal 
personality could equally be the resolution of a conference of States or uniform State practice.
83
 
Moreover, an entity may become an IO ‘by way of evolution’84, or may be created by 
conferences.
85
 Interpol, for example, is not founded on a formal treaty and has been identified as 
an IO, and the same holds true for the OSCE.
86
 In some cases, the decision of an IO constitutes 
the constitutional basis of a new IO.
87
 Hence, international agencies could be considered as IOs.  
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Essentially doing away with formalistic criteria, in assessing international legal 
personality Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill stress that the primary test is functionality:  
 
In its decision in Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 
the International Court of Justice, when referring to treaties creating “new subjects of 
law”, captured the essence of international personality, namely, entities “with a certain 
autonomy, to which the parties entrust the task of realizing certain common goals”. The 
“primary test” is functional…88  
  
As mentioned above, TRNs are usually not granted autonomy in the formal sense (ie, 
they do not have authority to conclude legally binding agreements with their counterparts). 
However, regulators certainly enjoy autonomy from the political level to harmonise regulation. 
Looked at from this perspective, the functional criteria is fulfilled, and harmonisation TRNs 
could be considered as being international legal persons, or even IOs.  
  
With regard to international agencies it has been noted that the picture is, at best, mixed. 
The examples reveal that international agencies continue to be dependent on member States, in 
so far as their internal architecture has an intergovernmental or multinational nature and they 
operate through administrative proceedings to which national authorities are called to 
participate. In functional terms, irrespective of their bureaucratic character, many international 
agencies can even be seen as mechanisms of administrative cooperation and integration among 
domestic authorities. This is not to ignore that certain forms of autonomy towards member 
States are emerging, in particular in cases where scientific expertise plays a large role. But even 
there the picture is mixed as is for instance illustrated by the CAC. In short, the strong links 
which exist between an international agency and the parent organisation, on the one hand, and 
the member States, on the other hand, may put the autonomy of such agencies into 
perspective.
89
 
 
c. Should IN-LAW bodies be recognized as new subjects of international law?  
 The most progressive approach has been to call for the recognition of trans-governmental 
regulatory networks as subjects of international law that would be directly and independently 
subject to international legal obligations.
90
 Slaughter has been the main proponent of this 
approach.
91
 She argues that the traditional notion of sovereignty, as an attribute borne by an 
entire State, is inadequate to capture the complexities of today’s IR.92 Therefore, each of the 
government units participating in networks should exercise a measure of sovereignty ‒ 
sovereignty specifically defined and tailored to their functions and capabilities.
93
 She bases this 
argument on the conception of a disaggregated world order: if the principal moving parts of that 
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order are government agencies, officials and so forth, then they must be able to exercise some 
independent rights and be subject to some independent, or at least distinct, obligations.
94
 
 
Is Slaughter’s proposal a desirable outcome for IN-LAW bodies, or at least the most 
significant ones? Should IN-LAW bodies possess international rights and duties (albeit 
partially)?  
 
Generally, the need to include new legal subjects when times are changing has been 
acknowledged by many. For example, Hersch Lauterpracht has pointed out that ‘it is 
important…to bear in mind that the range of subjects of international law is not rigidly and 
immutably circumscribed by any definition of the nature of international law but is capable of 
modification and development in accordance with the will of States and the requirements of 
international intercourse.’95 In the Reparations case, the ICJ held that  
 
throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the 
requirements of international life [and that] the progressive increase in the collective 
activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the international 
plane by certain entities which are not States. […] Such new subjects of international 
law need not necessarily be States or possess the rights and obligations of statehood.
96
  
 
Thus, new legal personalities may be added with changing times. And indeed, 
international law has seen a proliferation in the number of subjects added during the twentieth 
century.
97
 
 
In light of the above, the question we international lawyers must pose ourselves is 
whether the time has come to recognize a new set of subjects? Our tendency is to be cautiously 
positive towards the recognition of the legal personality of at least some IN-LAW bodies. We 
will explain this.  
 
The question of legal personality is primarily to be found at two levels. First, whether 
the body, rather than its component parts, possesses international rights and obligations. Second, 
when something has gone wrong, and responsibility is sought, whether the body or its 
component parts can be held responsible. The situation for IN-LAW bodies, under the 
traditional accounts, is that they are not directly subject to international law, and may not be 
held directly responsible or accountable for wrongful acts. 
 
In the current state of the world ‒where so much normative activity with globally far-
reaching effects is taking place by IN-LAW bodies ‒ this situation is unjustified. Responsibility 
and accountability should be a function of power, and not of legal status, as the saying ‘with 
                                                          
94Slaughter, ‘Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountabiity of Global Government 
Networks’ 188. 
95
Hersch Lauterpacht, ‛The Subjects of International Law’ in E. Lauterpacht (ed.) International Law, The 
Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, Volume I: The General Works (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1970)  para. 48. 
96
 Reparations case 174. 
97For a description of subjects of international law currently accepted, see Walter, ‘Subjects of 
International Law’, Section B.  
22 
 
great power comes great responsibility’ goes. Sticking to the traditional approaches hence runs 
the risk of creating injustice.  
 
One possible way to approach this would be to determine that whenever an international 
body exercises significant international public authority (as defined above), it should be directly 
subject to the relevant international legal rules as well as be directly responsible for any 
breaches of international law. Indeed, this would imply a separate legal status for these bodies. 
Following this approach, IN-LAW bodies that have significant public authority would be 
directly subject to international law and directly responsible for breaches of international law.  
 
We acknowledge that this approach requires further consideration, and the 
consequences, advantages, and disadvantages need to be carefully considered. For example, a 
possible drawback of such independent status may be that it enhances the power of the IN-LAW 
body and may, in turn, make it more difficult rather than easier to hold the IN-LAW actors 
accountable. Participating national actors may, for example, hide behind the body when it 
comes to responsibility; or independent international status may reduce the need for domestic 
implementation and the domestic control that comes with it.  
 
 
F. Is international legal personality important for accountability?   
 
1. Discussion 
 
The central question of the IN-LAW project is whether IN-LAW ‒ falling out of the 
traditional structures of domestic and international law ‒ raises more accountability concerns 
than traditional, formal, international or domestic bodies.
 98
 It is in this context that we pose the 
following questions: what role does the international legal status of a body have in relation to its 
accountability? Is international legal personality important for accountability?  
 
In recent years, during their search for solutions for accountability concerns, several 
groups of legal scholars attributed ever less importance to the doctrine of personhood. Rather, 
they have been suggesting legal frameworks that apply equally to formal and informal bodies. 
For example, the Global Administrative Law Project promotes the application of standards of 
accountability such as transparency and participation to all global administrative bodies, 
including both formal and informal bodies, such as International Agencies and TRNs.
99
   
Similarly, the Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions project, seeks to apply a 
public law approach to any exercise of international public authority, irrespective of whether it 
is conducted by formal or informal actors.
100
  
From this perspective, the question of the international legal status seems to be an 
outdated question, at least in the context of the discussion on accountability. Indeed, as 
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mentioned above, we too consider that it would be unjustified to focus on the question on this 
formality in the context of accountability. But the main point we wish to make here is that even 
if a body possesses legal personality, it is not very meaningful for accountability, at least not 
from a procedural perspective. The IN-LAW project focused on accountability from a 
procedural perspective
101
, and in the absence of a procedural international law on accountability 
(say, rules on transparency, participation, reason giving for decisions, complaints mechanism,  
etc.) international legal personality has little to contribute.  
  
The reason is that even if IN-LAW bodies have legal personality, these procedural 
principles are not to be considered as binding rules under international law, and are thus not 
applicable to formal and informal institutions alike.
 
There is no procedural international legal 
rule that obliges subjects to follow good administrative practice in its decision-making. This fact 
is already reflected in the big variations of participation possibilities and transparency policies 
in existing formal IOs such as the WHO, WTO, and ILO. The World Bank is one of the few if 
not the only IO that offers a complaints mechanism open to stakeholders affected by its 
policies.
102
 To the extent it could be established that these principles have become imbedded in 
international law, the answer would be more complicated but in the meantime that is the case.  
  
A different question is whether international legal personality would matter regarding 
the application of substantive international law to IN-LAW bodies. Here, the fear raised in the 
literature that IN-LAW bodies escape substantive international law altogether needs to be 
nuanced. The reason is that regulatory authorities or other State actors participating in the IN-
LAW body may be subject to international law through the rules on State responsibility. 
According to Article 4 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
103
 which reflect customary 
law
104
, acts by State organs (including regulators, agencies, etc.) even when acting 
independently from the central government
105
, can be attributed to the State.
106
 It logically 
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follows that whenever State organs collaborate internationally, all of the international legal 
obligations that apply to the State, apply to their activities, where applicable. Consequently, the 
State may be held responsible if regulators or any other State organs, in their activities in the 
bodies, breach international obligations applicable to the State. Article 47 is also relevant, 
setting out the principle that several States may be responsible for the same internationally 
wrongful act, for example when they act jointly in respect of an entire operation.
107
 
Accordingly, all governmental members could be held accountable for say breaches of 
international human rights law ‒ even in the absence of international legal personality. Similar 
reasoning would apply in relation to international agencies where either the member States 
would remain responsible or the parent organisation. In the latter case, the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations could provide guidance.
108
 
  
This situation is very reminiscent of partnership under domestic legal systems. While 
there are variations among civil and common law countries, and between the specific domestic 
arrangements, in many countries (such as England) partnerships do not possess separate legal 
personality. The partners will each be personally liable, jointly or severally, for the partnerships 
actions/debts. This could similarly be the case in harmonization networks, international agencies 
or other IN-LAW bodies.  
  
Furthermore, the entire set of international rights and duties that apply to States and IOs 
may continue to apply in their entirety, as applicable, to the governmental actors participating in 
the IN-LAW body. For example, it is clear that all international human rights applicable to a 
State apply to State organs in their IN-LAW activities. As independent entities, this would be 
debatable. There may, therefore, even be some merits to this approach.  
  
Having said that, the significant practical consequence of accepting the international 
legal personality of IN-LAW bodies from an accountability perspective would be twofold.  
  
First, as mentioned above, they would independently be subject to substantive 
international law, say, human rights law. That is important given that many IN-LAW bodies 
also consist of private actors that currently, even under the partnership scenario described 
above, escape international law. Second, they would be responsible for illegal acts performed by 
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them ‒ rather than the member States or IOs. This would mean that private bodies collaborating 
with governments, as is often the case in IN-LAW bodies, would be subject to the same 
responsibility regime as governments. But as mentioned above, there may be drawbacks such as 
reduced domestic accountability. Finally, given the fact that complaints mechanisms at the 
international level are virtually lacking, there would be no mechanism through which one could 
actually press charges.  
 
2. Example 
 
To illustrate the role of international legal personality in the accountability of IN-LAW 
bodies, let us go through the following real-life example.  
 
The ICH, a network of drug regulatory authorities and industry associations from the 
US, EU and Japan, issued a guidance on good clinical practices (GCPs). The GCP sets out how 
clinical trials should be conducted (that is, how drugs in development can be tested on human 
beings). With globalization, many drug companies conduct their clinical trials in developing 
countries so as to reduce costs. Since many of these drugs are intended for the US market, the 
FDA has a regulation on the acceptance of data from clinical trials conducted abroad. This 
regulation sets out what data the companies need to present to the FDA when applying for its 
approval and registration.  
 
In 2008 the FDA amended its regulation on the acceptance of data for clinical trials 
conducted abroad. It amended the requirement that clinical trials conducted outside of the US 
comply with the Declaration of Helsinki, and instead determined that they need to comply with 
the ICH GCP.  
 
One of the main concerns with this amendment was that the GCP allows the 
pharmaceutical industry to run clinical trials in which the patients in the control group can be 
treated with placebos instead of the existing proven therapy. In contrast, the Declaration of 
Helsinki, which is considered the perfect embodiment of international ethics standard for 
conducting clinical trials, requires that extreme care be taken in making use of placebos when 
there is an existing proven therapy. In other words, the DoH requires that new treatments should 
be tested against old treatments rather than placebos, whereas the GCP allows for new 
treatments to be tested against placebos.  
 
The background to the DoH’s requirement is ethical: In certain cases it may be unethical 
to give a placebo when an existing treatment is available. For example, in the past there have 
been cases where in trials of drugs for the prevention of maternal to child HIV transmission  
some women were given placebos even though an available treatment existed, and it resulted in 
children being infected whose disease might have been prevented had they received the existing 
treatment.
109
 On the other hand, administering placebos rather than alternative treatment is 
cheaper for the drug companies. 
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Given the above, would the existence or lack of international legal personality of the 
ICH make any difference for accountability?  
 
As regards procedural legal claims if we consider, say, a patient organisation that would 
have liked to participate in the drafting of the GCP, or, for instance, of a patient in Africa who 
has been administrated placebo in a clinical trial – could this patient submit a complaint or seek 
recourse against the ICH? The answer is in the negative. In the absence of a procedural 
international law on accountability including elements such as good administrative procedures, 
and complaints mechanisms, international legal personality remains irrelevant.  
 
As regards substantive claims regarding inconsistence with human rights law (without 
going into a debate over whether the DoH reflects human rights law or merely ethical 
standards), lacking legal personality, the ICH as a body is not subject to international human 
rights law. The governmental members of the ICH are, however, bound by international human 
rights law. Claims against the US, Japan, and the EU could be brought before the existing 
international human rights bodies and/or domestic courts where applicable. While the industry 
could be shamed in light of business and human rights standards, there would not be an 
international legal claim against it.  
 
On the other hand, if the ICH had legal personality, a direct legal claim against it could 
be raised. That said, there is no obligation under IL to provide a complaints mechanism, and, 
hence, it is unclear with which forum such a claim could be raised. So far very few international 
bodies have set up complaints mechanisms, the World Bank Inspection Panel being a notable 
exception.  
 
To conclude, legal personality would allow for substantive claims to be raised directly 
towards the ICH. While that may lead to pressure, these claims cannot be enforced. Moreover, 
in the absence of a procedural international law on good administrative practices, legal 
personality is not a significant factor. Were an international rule on procedural accountability to 
exist, international legal personality would have more significance.  
 
 
G. Conclusion  
 
The present contribution purported to describe the status of IN-LAW bodies under 
public international law, including a particular focus on harmonisation networks and 
international agencies. It also sought to understand the consequence of the international legal 
status for questions of accountability.  
 
Our analysis confirms that even when international cooperation is informal (at the 
process, actor, or output level), this does not prevent a certain or even considerable degree of 
institutionalisation. Despite such formalism, under most traditional accounts harmonisation 
networks and international agencies are not IOs or international legal persons although they 
could be considered as such under more liberal or contemporary approaches. At the same time it 
also becomes clear that IN-LAW takes place in fora of different forms and shapes which makes 
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it difficult to draw general conclusions with regard to their international legal status and the 
applicability of (general) international law. 
  
As this Chapter has demonstrated, in the current state of international law, that is, in the 
absence of a procedural international law on accountability, legal personality is largely 
meaningless in relation to accountability questions. This is already well-reflected in the fact that 
we see wide variations in the extent to which stakeholders participate in the decision-making 
processes of formal IOs as, for instance, the WTO, WHO, ITU, World Bank or ILO, or in the 
extent to which the latter have complaint mechanisms at their disposal (for example, only the 
World Bank has an Inspection Panel where claims by stakeholders against policies can be 
raised). Organisations that do have them, largely do so as a matter of practice or due to bottom-
up application of domestic practices/laws, rather than as a matter of international legal 
obligation.  
 
With respect to substantive international law, even in the absence of legal personality, 
the IN-LAW body’s membership being composed of States and/or IOs, each governmental 
member is bound by international law, albeit indirectly through States and/or international 
organisations. IN-LAW bodies, hence, cannot escape substantive international law altogether.  
  
That being said, there are advantages of having legal personality. IN-LAW bodies 
would directly be subject to substantive international law (albeit partly), and as such, claims 
regarding breaches of international law could be brought to them by a direct process. While ‒ 
given for instance the relative independence of some of the bodies ‒ there may be justifications 
as well as advantages to such an approach, and it may have several drawbacks. In the future we 
should further contemplate the consequences, advantages, and disadvantages of bestowing (at 
least some) IN-LAW bodies with legal personality. 
